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Abstract
To detect any (unknown) virus, automatic 
signature schemes are proposed to be embedded 
in honestly-made compilers.  But compiling 
load is centralized on the compiler makers.  To 
distribute compiling load with the help of 
distributed servers, proxy automatic signature 
schemes are proposed for the distributed 
compilers.  However, Lin and Jan’s proxy 
automatic signature scheme is insecure and has 
length restriction of source programs.  To 
remove these flaws, Hwang and Li also 
proposed their scheme.  However, two 
signatures are used for the agreement of 
compiler makers and servers, respectively.  But 
only the signature for the proxy agreement of 
compiler makers can be validated by anyone.  
To remove this inefficient flaw, a new efficient 
proxy automatic signature scheme is proposed.  
Except the efficient advantage, the proxy 
agreement being researched both by the 
compiler maker and servers can be validated by 
anyone at the same time.  Only one signature is 
used to show the agreement.  The correctness 
of compilers and executable programs can be 
validated without releasing source codes.  
Moreover the moderator can easily find out 
infection sources. 
Keywords: Compilers, distributed system, 
computer virus, digital 
signature, proxy signatures, 
automatic signatures. 
1. Introduction 
For the time being, there is more and more 
convenient in data transmission with the Internet.  
Unfortunately, Internet is an insecure 
environment, so the computer viruses, crackers, 
and many computer crimes may damage or 
modify your data in computer.  Recently the 
computer virus has become a serious security 
problem.  Some anti-virus packages are 
adopted to detect the existence of computer virus.  
But unknown virus cannot be detected by the 
anti-virus packages.  A new concept for virus 
detection has been proposed by adopting digital 
signatures.  Since digital signatures can 
guarantee the integrity of signed files, the 
signature is used to ensure that the executable 
file is not infected by (unknown) virus. 
In 1993, Okamoto first proposes a 
cryptographic solution for detecting virus by 
digital signature schemes [8].  By the way of 
checking the consistency of the original 
executable program with its corresponding 
signature to check whether or not the executable 
program is infected by virus. 
Another cryptographic scheme proposed 
by Usuda et al. [11] is the automatic signature 
scheme using compilers.  When a compiler 
maker adopts honestly-made compilers to 
compile source programs, the compiler 
automatically produces the executable program 
and companying signature without interrupt.  
The automatic signature scheme can reduce the 
probability of infecting virus because the 
correctness of executable programs is validated 
by the companying automatic signatures.  Thus 
any virus infection can be found out after the 
verification of the automatic signatures. 
However, the compiler maker becomes the 
compiling bottleneck because any compiling 
tasks should be performed by the compiler 
maker.  To distribute the compiling load, Lin 
and Jan [5] proposed their automatic signature 
scheme using a compiler in distributed systems.  
Because Lin and Jan’s scheme adopts the 
signature scheme with message recovery mode, 
their scheme has length restriction for the source 
programs.  Moreover, their scheme is insecure 
[10].  To overcome these flaws, Hwang and Li 
[3] proposed their proxy automatic signature 
scheme based on the concept of proxy signature 
schemes [6].  In Hwang and Li’s scheme, one 
signature is used for the proxy agreement of 
servers while another signature is used to show 
the proxy agreement of compiler makers.  It is 
inefficient to use two signatures for the proxy 
agreement between compiler makers and servers.  
Moreover, except compiler makers, no one can 
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validate the agreement of servers. 
To overcome the above problems in 
Hwang and Li’s scheme, a new proxy automatic 
signature scheme using a compiler is proposed 
in Section 3.  In the next section, the basic 
assumption and model for the new scheme is 
described.  In Section 4, some security issues 
and discussions are given.  The final section is 
our conclusion. 
2. Our Basic Assumptions and Model 
The basic assumptions relative our basic 
model is first given in the first subsection.  
Then the underlying basic model for our scheme 
is given. 
2.1 Assumptions 
Our assumptions are classified into three 
classes.  One class is the set of assumptions 
about virus, one class is the set of assumptions 
about the compiler maker, and one class is the 
set of security assumptions [3, 5, 10-11].  Three 
classes are described, respectively. 
Class 1 (About viruses): 
This class contains three assumptions 
about the computer virus’s operations. 
(1) Viruses infect only executable files, not 
pure text files. 
(2) Viruses damage or modify both executable 
files and text files. 
(3) The priority of execution for compiler is 
higher than the execution of any virus 
such that virus cannot interrupt it. 
Class 2 (About compiler maker) 
This class contains two assumptions about 
the compiler maker’s operation. 
(1) The compilers are honestly created by the 
compiler maker. 
(2) Compiler maker cannot refuse to reply to 
the requester’s questions per requests. 
Class 3 (About security) 
This class contains three assumptions 
about the security of our scheme. 
(1) The discrete logarithm program is a 
computational hard problem. 
(2) The one-way hash function is strong and 
against finding the collisions. 
(3) The distributed systems must properly 
execute the verification program. 
2.2  Our Basic Model 
The basic model for our protocol is 
described here.  In the basic model, there are 
six kinds of participates: a trusted third party 
(TTP for short), the compiler maker (Um), the 
server (Us), the requester (Ur), customers, and a 
trusted moderator.  Our basic model consists of 
five phases: Initialization phase, compiler 
maker-server authorization phase, 
sever-requester execution phase, custom 
verification phase, and judge phase.  These 
phases are described, respectively. 
In the initialization phase, TTP constructs 
the system-wild parameters and some public 
cryptographic functions.  Each legal user 
randomly generates his/her private key and 
computes the corresponding public key.  The 
public key of each user is certificated by TTP. 
In the compiler maker-server authorization 
phase, a server Us requests the compiler maker 
Um a compiler, named CR, in order to provide the 
compiling service on behalf of the compiler 
maker.  The compiler maker Um provides the 
server Us with the compiler CR which can 
automatically and non-interruptively generate 
the signature both on source programs and the 
corresponding executable file generated by CR.
In order to show the agreement of the compiler 
maker and the server, a suitable proxy delegation 
algorithm is cooperatively executed both by the 
compiler maker and the server.  Then the server 
will obtain a proxy private key which is only 
computed by the server.  At the same time the 
compiler is integrated with a proxy automatic 
signature generation algorithm. 
The server Us uses the verifiable compiler 
CR to compile the source program M sent from 
the requester Ur.  Then the generated 
executable program E is sent to the requester Ur.
The requester Ur sends the executable program 
E when the customer buys it.  In our model, 
servers are distributed over the Internet.  When 
a server compiles a source program, the server 
adopts the compiler CR to automatically create 
both the executable program and its signature.  
The modification of signed compilers, source 
programs and executable programs can be 
detected by checking the consistency of their 
accompanying signatures.  To reduce the 
storage of signatures, being inspired of the 
concept of multi-proxy multi-signature schemes 
[4], the proxy certificate between servers and 
compiler makers is the signature generated by 
the cooperation of servers and compiler makers.  
Then the proxy certificate shows that the proxy 
agreement is made by both the original signer 
and servers. 
Definition (Discrete-logarithm-based 
signature scheme [1, 2, 7])
Suppose that the signer is Ui with the 
public key yi and private key xi.  A 
discrete-logarithm-based (DL for short) 
signature scheme is a signature scheme based on 
the discrete logarithm problem.  In a DL 
signature scheme, there is a singing algorithm (r,
s)= sigxi(M) and a verification algorithm veryi((r,
s), M){true, false}, where M is a message. 
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An example of DL signature scheme 
Some DL signature schemes are proposed 
[1, 2, 7].  Here, the DSA in [2] is described.  
In DSA, TTP selects two large primes p and q
satisfying q | p-1 and an element g Zp* with 
order q.  A user Ui selects a private key xiZq*
and computes a public key yi= gxi mod p.  To 
sign a message m, the user chooses a random 
integer vZ*q and computes r = (g v mod p) mod 
q and s = r-1(m+ rxi) mod q.  The signature for 
the message m is (r, s).  To verify the signature 
(r, s) for m, a verifier checks whether or not r {
((gms
-1
yirs
-1
) mod p) (mod q).  Hereafter, the 
system-wild parameters p, q, and g are also 
suitable for the other DL signature scheme.  
The public key and private key of the user Ui are 
also yi and xi, respectively. 
Definition (Automatic signature schemes) 
Suppose that the signer is Ui with the 
public key yi and the private key xi.  An 
automatic signature scheme is a signature 
scheme with the automatically signing algorithm 
S= autosigxi(M) and the verification algorithm 
veryi(S, M){true, false}, where M is a message 
and S is the signature.  The automatically 
signing algorithm autosigxi(M) can be embedded 
into a executable program in such a way that the 
output M of the executable program and the 
signature generation S= autosigxi(M) are 
executed sequentially without any interrupt. 
An example of automatic signature schemes 
In essential, an automatic signature scheme 
is a signature scheme embedded in to an 
executable program.  If the underlying 
signature scheme is a DL signature scheme, then 
S= (r, s)= autosigx(M) and very((r, s), M){true,
false}.  To set up system parameters, TTP 
generates the system-wild parameters p, q, and q.  
TTP also publishes a cryptographic one-way 
function h(). 
Suppose that UA writes a source program 
M and needs UB’s help to compile her source 
program with signature for the executable 
program.  UA first sends a request and his/her 
source program M to UB.  After getting the 
executable program E on M by compilers, the 
automatic signature signing algorithm 
autosigxB(E||M) is immediately performed to 
generate the automatic signature (r, s) on E and 
M.
Definition (Proxy Signature scheme) 
In the proxy signature scheme [6], an 
original signer is allowed to authorize a 
designate person as his proxy signer.  Then the 
proxy signer is able to generate signatures on 
messages on behalf of an original signer.  
Suppose that the original signer is UO and the 
proxy signer is UP.  The authorizing algorithm 
C = Autho(w, xO, yO, xP, yP), can generate a 
proxy certificate C on the proxy warrant w for 
the proxy signer UP.  Then everyone can 
validate C by using CertV(w, C, yO, yP). 
To generate the signature on the message 
M, the proxy signer can use the proxy signing 
algorithm S = ProxySig(C, xP, yP, M) to generate 
the proxy signature (S, C) of M.  Then the 
proxy signature is (S, C) can be validated by 
ProxysigV(S, C, yO, yP, M)
An example of a proxy signature scheme 
Being inspired of the multi-proxy 
multi-signature scheme in [4], our proxy 
signature scheme is proposed below.  One of 
the advantages of the scheme in [4] is that the 
proxy authorization is based on the agreement 
from not only original signers but also proxy 
signers.  Hence it is efficient to check the 
agreement of original signers and proxy signers 
at the same time.  The system parameters and 
public functions are the same as those in the DL 
signature scheme. 
The authorizing algorithm C = Autho(w, xO,
yO, xP, yP) is given here, where w is the proxy 
warrant.  To construct proxy authorization, UO
and UP first select random numbers kO and 
kPZ*q, respectively.  UO and UP compute KO = 
gkO mod p and KP = gkP mod p, respectively.  
Then UP sends KP to UO and UO sends KO to UP.
Both UO and UP compute K = KOuKP mod p by 
themselves.  Then UO finds vO = h(w)xOyO+ kOK
mod q and UP finds vP = h(w)xPyP+ kPK mod q.
UO sends vO to UP while UP sends vP to UO. UO
validates vP by checking gvP { (yPyP)h(w)u(KP)K
(mod p) and UP validates vO by checking gvO {
(yOyo)h(w)u(KO)K (mod p).  Finally both they 
obtain the proxy certificate C= (K, V), where V=
vO + vP mod q.  The proxy certificate C= (K, V)
can be validated by adopting the equation gV {
(yPyP uyOyo) h(w)u(K)K (mod p).  Therefore, 
CertV(w, C, yO, yP) is to check whether the 
equation gV{ (yPyPuyOyo)h(w)u(K)K (mod p) holds 
or not. 
To generate the signature on a message M,
the proxy singer UP first selects a random 
integer t and computes r= gt mod p.  Then UP
computes s= (Vt + xPyP rh(M)) mod q.  Then 
the proxy signature of the message M is (w, (K,
V), (r, s)).  The proxy signature is verified by 
using the equations gV { (yPyP uyOyo) h(w)u(K)K
(mod p) and gs { rV(yPyP)rh(M) (mod p).
3. Our Realization of Our Proxy 
Automatic Signature Scheme 
Using a Compiler in Distributed 
Systems
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Our realization is described phase by phase 
in the following. 
Initialization phase 
In this phase, TTP and each participate 
generate their parameters listed below. 
(1) TTP selects a public large public prime p, a 
public prime factor q of p-1, and a public 
element gZ*p with order q. 
(2) TTP publishes a cryptographic hash 
function h(). 
(3) Each participate Ui selects his/her private 
key xiZ*q and computes his/her public key 
yi= g
xi mod p.  Then the public key yi is 
certificated by TTP. 
Some notations used in our realization are 
defined below. 
CR: CR denotes the executable compiler 
created by the honest compiler maker. 
w: w denotes the proxy warrant w between 
the compiler marker and servers.  The 
proxy warrant w specifies the necessary 
proxy details.  The proxy details at 
least include the identities of the original 
signers and proxy signers, the public 
keys of the original singer and proxy 
signers, the compiler CR with the 
corresponding information and the 
authorization period. 
P: P denotes the source program sent from 
the requester Ur.
E: E denotes the executable program on the 
source program M from the requester 
Ur.
Compiler maker-Server authorization phase 
Suppose that both the compiler maker Um
and the server Us make an agreement of the 
proxy warrant w in advance.  In order to show 
that they both agree of proxy authorization, both 
Um and Us cooperatively generate the proxy 
certificate for the proxy signer (server Us) on the 
proxy warrant w and the compiler CR.  At the 
same time, the compiler maker Um sends the 
compiler CR requested by the server Us.  By 
using the compiler CR, the server is authorized to 
automatically sign source programs and 
executable programs compiled by CR.
Step 1:  The compiler maker Um selects a 
random integer kmZ*q, computes 
Km = gkm mod p
and sends Km to the server Us.  At 
the same time, the server Us selects a 
random integer ksZq* and computes 
Ks = gks mod p.
Then Ks is sent to the compiler maker 
Um.
Step 2:  The server Us and the compiler 
maker Um computes 
K = Km Ks mod p.
Step 3: The compiler maker Um computes 
vm = h(w||h(CR))xm ym + km K mod q.
Um sends vm and h(CR) to the server 
Us.
Step 4:  The server Us validates vm and h(CR)
by the equation gvm { ymym
h(w||h(CR))KSK (mod p).  If the above 
equation holds, Us computes vs = h(w
|| h(CR)) xs ys + ks K mod q, and sends 
vs to the compiler maker Um.
Step 5:  Compiler maker Um verifies the  
correctness of vs by the equation 
gvs { ysys h(w||h(CR))KsK (mod p).
If the above equation holds, the 
compiler maker Um send the server 
Us the compiler CR . 
Step 7:  Server Us checks the correctness of  
CR by using the digest h(CR). 
Both Us and Um computes V= vm+vs
mod q.
At last the proxy certificate on the proxy warrant 
w and the compiler CR is (K, V).  Both the 
compiler maker and the server reach an 
agreement to authorize the server as a compiler 
proxy agent.
Server-Requester execution phase 
The requester Ur sends the request and the 
source program P to the server Us in order to 
compile P with the aid of the server Us.   Then 
Us sends the executable program E for P and the 
corresponding automatic proxy signature to the 
requester Ur.
Step 1: The requester Ur generates his/her 
digital signature (er, sr) = 
signxr(h(Ur||P)) adopting a DL 
signature scheme [1-2, 7].  Then 
he/she sends (Ur, P, (er, sr)) to the 
server Us.
Step 2: The server Us validates (er, sr) on the 
digest h(Ur||P) by performing veryr((er,
sr), h(Ur||P)). 
Step 3: If (er, sr) is correct, then Us first 
validates his/her compiler CR by the 
equation gV { (ysys uymym) h(w||h(CR))uKK
(mod p).  The server Us feeds his/her 
private key xs, the proxy certificate (K,
V) and the program P into the validated 
compiler CR.  After generating the 
executable program E on P, the 
compiler CR immediately and 
automatically generates the signature 
(R, S) on the digest h(E, K, V, h(P)) by 
adopting a suitable DL signature 
generation algorithm.  During the 
compiling process, the code and data 
memory belonging to CR should be 
protected from any unauthorized 
modification except CR and the 
operation system.  Finally, Us sends 
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(w, (K, V), (R, S)), h(CR), and E to the 
request Ur.
After obtaining (w, (K, V), E, (R, S)) from 
the server Us, the requester Ur checks the 
multi-proxy multi-signature as the following 
steps.
Step 1:   Verify the warrant w and the  
certificate (K, V) by the equation 
gV { KK[ysys ycyc]h(w, h(CR)) (mod p)
Step 2:  Check the correctness of the 
multi-proxy multi-signature (R, S) by 
the equation gS { RV[ycyc]Rh(E, K, V, h(P))
(mod p).
Customer verification phase 
The customer Uc sends the request to the 
requester Ur for executable program E, and the 
request Ur send the executable program E to the 
customer Uc.
The customer got the executable program 
and its corresponding signature from the 
requester. After the customer receives (w, h(P), 
h(CR), (K, V), E, (R, S)), he/she verifies it in two 
steps.
Step 1: Verify the warrant w, h(CR), and the 
certificate (K, V) by the equation gV {
KK (ymym ysys)h(w||CR) (mod p).  If the 
equation does not hold, reject the proxy 
signature (R, S)
Step 2: Check the correctness of the proxy 
signature (R,S) and the executable 
program E by the equation gS {
Rv(ysys)R h(E) (mod p).  If the equation 
holds, the executable program E had 
not been modified, and it can be 
accept.
Judge phase 
When the customer finds the executable 
program from the request infected by virus, 
several possible situations are considered. 
(1) The server adopts an infected 
compiler to generate executable 
programs. 
(2) The request may write a program 
with virus. 
(3) The executable program may be 
infected virus in customer’s 
computing environment. 
First of all, the customer sends (w, h(P), 
h(CR), (K, V), E, (R, S)) to moderator for 
detecting the source of virus.  The moderator 
performs the verification gV{ KK(ymym ysys)h(w||h(CR))
(mod p) to check whether the server performed 
the invalid compiler.  If the verification 
equation does not hold, the executable file may 
be infected virus in server’s computing 
environment.  Otherwise, the server is stainless. 
If the server used the correct and clean 
compiler, then the moderator will have a 
suspicion that the request may have a bad 
intention.  That is the requester writes a virus 
program, and sends it to the customer.  To 
judge this suspicion, the moderator checks the 
signature of the executable program E by gS {
Rv(ysys)R h(E) (mod p).  If the equation holds, the 
moderator must ask the requester to provide the 
source program of E and checks whether or not 
the source program contains virus.  Finally, 
neither the server or the requester produces the 
virus, the executable program may infect virus 
in the customer’s computing environment. 
4. Security Issues and Discussions 
Our scheme has some advantages.  In the 
Compiler maker-Server authorization phase of 
Lin and Jan’s scheme, one signature is used to 
guarantee the agreement of the server while one 
signature is used to guarantee the agreement of 
the compiler maker and the correctness of the 
compiler sent to the server.  It is expensive the 
check these thing by perform the signature 
verification twice.  It is not reasonable that no 
one is able to find out the agreement of the 
server in the other phases.  So, in our Compiler 
maker-Server authorization phase, one proxy 
certificate is used to guarantee the agreement 
both form the compiler maker and servers.  
Moreover, this certificate is also used to 
guarantee the correctness of the compiler for the 
server and anyone.  In other words, the 
agreement from the compiler maker and server 
and the correctness of the compiler can be 
efficiently validated by anyone. 
In our verification phase and judge phase, 
the requester’s source code and the executable 
program can be verified without reveal the 
content of source code.  It can protect the 
program author’s privacy.  But if the source 
program contains some malicious code to infect 
others, the original source code must be revealed 
to proof its legitimate. 
In our scheme, the security is base on the 
proxy signature scheme and one-way hash 
function.  There some possible attacks in our 
scheme are discussed below. 
Security of proxy signature 
The security of the proxy certificate (K, V)
is considered.  The malicious users want to 
forge the individual proxy certificate (Vm).  To 
pass the verification equation gvm{ ymh(w||h(CR))ym
KmK (mod p), the forger must generate a forged 
individual certificate (K'm, V'm).  If the value 
K'm is determined first, it is hard to find V'm for 
the DL problem gV'm{ ymh(w||h(CR))ymK'mK (mod p).  
If the value of V'm is determined first, it is hard 
to find the K'm from the equation K'm{ [g
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V'
m(ymh(w|| h(CR))ym)-1]K'm
-1K
s
-1
 (mod p).  So, (Km, Vm)
can not be forged.  By the similar analysis, it is 
also hard to forge another individual proxy 
certificate (Ks, Vs).  Therefore, the proxy 
certificate (K, V) can’t be forged. 
The proxy signature can be used to protect 
the original signer and the proxy signer.  The 
original signer must delegate authority to the 
proxy signer, and only the proxy signer can 
generate the proxy signature.  If someone 
wants to generate the proxy signature without 
the original signer giving authority, he/she must 
have original signer’s private key xs to generate 
vm. Without the original signer’s private key, 
he/she must forge vm and pass the equation vm = 
h(w||CR)xmym + kmK mod q. But to solve the 
equation is difficult, so the proxy signature can 
protect original signer. 
On the other hand, the proxy signature can also 
protect proxy signer.  The proxy signature of 
the message E is (R, S), S = (Vt + xsysRh(E)) 
mod q.  The original signer have no proxy 
signer’s private key, so he/she can’t generate the 
proxy signature that pass the equation. 
Security of private keys 
The malicious may want to forge the 
private key from the public key, he/she must 
solve the equation yi = gxi mod p.  But it is a 
discrete logarithm problem. 
5. Conclusion
The automatic signature scheme using a 
compiler in distributed system is first proposed 
by Lin and Jan in 2000[5].  But their scheme 
cannot withstand forgery attack and has 
restriction of the source program [10].  
Although Hwang and Li [3] proposed their 
improvement, Hwang and Li’s scheme is 
inefficient to use two signatures for the proxy 
agreement between compiler makers and servers.  
To remove this inefficient problem, a new proxy 
automatic signature scheme is proposed.  By 
the aid of automatic signature schemes, any 
modification of original programs can be found 
in advance by verifying the signature of original 
programs.  In our scheme, only one signature is 
used to show the agreement between the 
compiler maker and servers.  Besides, in the 
server-requester execution phase, any DL 
signature scheme is suitable to adopt.  This 
property makes our scheme more and more 
freely for many conditions.  Moreover, the 
origin of the infection can be specified to 
identify the responsibility. 
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